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12 ‘We don’t have women in boxes’ 
Channelling seasonal mobility of female farmworkers between Morocco and Andalusia 
Emmanuelle Hellio 
 
Listen, a typical farmer who’s just 
completed his agricultural season, what is he 
doing? He puts his tools and stuff away and goes 
off to celebrate. He might say: ‘I’m off to El Rocío’1 
and doesn’t think about the next season. But once 
it starts, he just all of a sudden wants ‘his women’ 
[workers]. We have to reply: ‘We don’t have 
women in boxes!’ The farmer, however, remains 
relaxed. He knows, every year when he needs 
women, he will get them. We will take care of his 
labour supply. (Director of International 
Placement, Moroccan Agency for the Promotion of 
Employment and Competencies (ANAPEC), 17 July 
2011, Casablanca). 
 
Introduction 
Women do not ‘come in boxes’ but they are part of a highly contained system of labour 
mobility that adjusts flexibly to serve industrial agriculture in the province of Huelva.2 In 
this agricultural region of Andalusia, Spain, an intensive monoculture of strawberries 
began to develop in the 1980s. Today, more than 7,500 ha are under cultivation in 
greenhouses. The production is export orientated and capital intensive. In order to plant 
one hectare of strawberries, a farmer has to invest between EUR 25,000 to 30,000 for 
necessary materials (e.g. plastic, tubes, phytosanitary products) and labour expenses. 
                                                          
1 The pilgrimage of El Rocío, a village located in the province of Huelva, is the most important in 
Spain. It attracts hundreds of thousands of pilgrims around Pentecost every year. 
2 This chapter stems from my research on the mobility of Moroccan women in Andalusian 
strawberry farming. The fieldwork consisted of 70 interviews with workers, growers, 
cooperatives, union workers and members of the institutions involved in recruitment, as well as 
observations on farms during the strawberry seasons between 2008 and 2011 and in farm 
workers’ families in Morocco in 2010 and 2011. In order to protect the anonymity of my 
informants, all names of persons and firms in this article are pseudonyms. 
 
Labour is one of the most important factors of production, estimated to be up to 30 per 
cent of the total cost.3 Driven by the strawberry industry, this zone of intensive 
monoculture has become a crossroads for international migration. There have been 
massive changeovers in the composition of seasonal labour over the past ten years: first 
North African and sub-Saharan men were recruited; then Polish and Romanian women; 
followed by women from Morocco. The presence of this diversified workforce is the 
consequence of the employers’ preferences, shaped by European and national migratory 
policies, and business ventures linked to private initiatives and regional policy interests. It 
is embedded in the rearrangement of European spaces and the legal practices of the 
Spanish state towards undocumented migrants.4 
This chapter focuses on the recruitment of female labour from Morocco for Andalusian 
strawberry farming. I address the interplay of coercion and control inscribed into the 
constantly changing recruitment mechanisms shaped by production requirements on the 
one hand, and the persistence of Moroccan women’s interaction with agricultural 
production and respective labour markets translating into an unintended empowerment 
for some of them on the other hand. I will begin by explaining how ‘contracting in the 
countries of origin’ (contratación en origen) (see Lindner and Kathmann, this volume) 
evolved in Morocco and reveal how the flow of seasonal workers governs flexible forms of 
work organization. I address the gap between EU funding intentions and regional 
recruitment dynamics. Special attention is given to the social locations where control 
mechanisms are implemented – namely instrumentalizing female family attachment as a 
means of guaranteeing the return of workers. I will, however, demonstrate how women 
within these omnipresent control mechanisms seek to direct and command their 
mobilities and develop their own positions: 
Morocco as a new labour pool 
                                                          
3 Interview with agricultural technicians in one of the main cooperatives of Huelva, 13 May 
2011, Moguer. 
4 Illegalized migrants who have been present in Spain for at least three years can obtain a one-
year residence permit if they find a one-year contract. 
 
Huelvan farmers originally hired Andalusian day labourers but began to recruit North 
Africans in the 1990s, predominantly men. In 1999, producers started to hire female 
seasonal workers through employer organizations and by means of ‘origin contracts’ 
(contratos en origen). Recruited for the duration of the harvest, these migrants must 
contractually agree to return to their home country at the end of the season. Using this 
new means of labour recruitment, the farmers of Huelva have hired tens of thousands of 
female workers in the last decade claiming that their hands are more delicate (Hellio, 
2009). Origin contracting started with Poland and Romania, then expanded to Morocco. 
Today, it is mainly used for Morocco.5 As figure 12.1 shows, Polish and Romanian workers 
still comprise the majority of those harvesting strawberries in Huelva but the recent entry 
of the two states into the EU has temporarily released seasonal workers from the 
obligation to apply for a work permit.6 Eastern European workers are thus contracted by 
other means.  
The recruitment of Moroccan women became widely common in 2006. The first among 
them, however, crossed the Mediterranean as early as 2000. While certain cooperatives 
of Huelva used this new opportunity to recruit a few hundred women in Poland, the family 
business Fresdeloc started the process in Morocco. At the time, Fresdeloc was established 
in Huelva but had already moved part of its production to Moulay Bousselham in Morocco 
at the beginning of the 1990s. It profited from the new recruitment method by 
transferring a few dozen seasonal workers from its Moroccan to its Spanish farms. Over 
the course of the following years, recruitment in Poland, then in Romania, developed 
exponentially in all Huelvan farms, except for the one owned by Fresdeloc: they continued 
preferring ‘their’ Moroccan workforce over Eastern European women who ‘they do not 
know’ (Martin Herrero, founder of Fresdeloc, Moguer, 25 May 2010). When Poland and 
                                                          
5 Recently, bilateral agreements allowing for the contracting of migrant workers have been 
further expanded towards African countries with Senegal as a pilot experience. 
6 As of 22 July 2011, Spain has re-enacted its moratorium on Romanian labour, which it had 
rescinded on 1 January 2009. As a consequence of the economic crisis, it once more requires 
Romanian nationals to apply for a work permit (BOE, 2011). 
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Romania joined the EU in 2005 and 2009 respectively, seasonal workers from those 
countries gained the right to legally and freely work in the entire EU.  
Figure 12.1 Evolution and nationality of contracted female workers for agriculture in Huelva 
(2001–2010) 
Source: Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal, data obtained in 2010 
 
Against this backdrop, in 2005, the municipality of Cartaya, one of the main strawberry- 
producing villages in the province of Huelva, submitted the project ‘Aeneas- Cartaya: 
Ethical Management Project for Circular Migration’ to the European Commission. 
Acknowledging the fact that temporary immigration was a necessity for local agriculture, 
but also that ‘disorganized’ or ‘illegal’ immigration created problems with the integration 
of the foreign population in the villages, they proposed to take a leading role in the 
establishment of a project to manage the flow of legal and temporary labour between the 
province of Huelva and Morocco. For the director of the project, this initiative follows 
from the assessment that Romanian workers, now members of the EU, have become too 
mobile: 
From a mercantilist point of view, Romanians are no longer recruited. [A] contracted 
labourer from a non-EU source can only work in Huelva while the Romanian goes where 
she wants. That’s why and how businesses gradually convert their labour. [I] run such a 
business: I had Romanians, who are EU citizens, coming to work here. In the days 
following, there might be work elsewhere, in a bar for instance, and she leaves me. Not 
the Moroccan one, she has to work in agriculture 
(Jesús Oveja, 14 May 2009, Office for Foreign and Seasonal Workers, Cartaya). 
 
The director of the Moroccan employment agency used a similar example to describe the 
relative advantage of the labour he made available to employers in Huelva: 
 People from Eastern countries arrive individually, they sign contracts but it isn’t like origin 
contracting, it’s riskier for the employer. They’re easier to cancel. Employers aren’t 
reassured, they know that their workforce is not stable; that workers say to themselves, 
for example: ‘when the season in Lérida begins, I’ll go there and leave the farm in Huelva 
(Mr Hamzani, 17 July 2011, ANAPEC, Casablanca). 
 
The project was developed in accordance with the EU’s views regarding labour migration. 
Since the end of the 1990s and more specifically since 2007 (EC, 2007), the European 
Commission, following other international organizations (Geiger and Pécoud, 2010), has 
promoted a policy of temporary labour migration under the heading ‘win-win-win 
migration’, which allegedly fulfils the expectations of all players involved: country of 
origin, host country and the foreign workers themselves. This policy was financed by the 
European programme Aeneas which subsidized the Cartaya project to the tune of EUR 1.4 
million to develop a recruitment strategy for seasonal workers in Morocco. This change in 
recruitment policy led by the large employer cooperatives in collaboration with local 
authorities was, however, not appreciated by a number of employers who were used to 
Eastern European workers and refused to recruit in Morocco, categorizing the Moroccan 
men present in the area for more than ten years as dangerous and confrontational 
workers. In order to launch the recruitment drive, local authorities who had the power to 
approve companies’ demands for foreign labour only gave their assent to requests for 
Romanians and Ukrainians if the employer agreed to recruit a certain quota of Moroccan 
women. Most of the employers finally overcame their reluctance: this was based on 
positive experiences with Moroccan women and the new planning constraints resulting 
from the new liberties of circulation granted to Romanian and Polish nationals, which 
made them a lot less controllable. As of 2008, the entire strawberry sector was ready to 
make use of this pool of alternative labour on a large scale. Although the recruitment in 
Morocco operates within the legal framework of origin contracting as used to be the case 
with Poland and Romania, the management of the seasonal labour flows between Spain 
and Morocco has taken on a specific form. It was shaped by the partnership between the 
Municipality of Cartaya, the administrative agency for the programme on the Spanish side, 
and the Moroccan Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Competencies (ANAPEC, 
Agence nationale de promotion de l’emploi et des compétences). 
EU funding intentions and regional realities 
Contrary to previous recruitment campaigns, which were in part subsidized by the Spanish 
State,7 the initiators of the Aeneas-Cartaya project benefited from a much larger budget in 
2006: EUR 1.6 million in subsidies intended exclusively  for  the  management  of  this  
seasonal  workforce.  They  could  also mobilize a budget of EUR 5 million on the 
Moroccan side handed over to ANAPEC  by  the  European  Commission  for  a  project  
entitled  ‘International Support for the Circulation of Persons’ and aiming to promote the 
placement of Moroccans on the international labour market.8 Whereas the project was 
initially aimed at qualified personnel, Moroccan officials soon realized that there was a 
substantial gap between the promotion of temporary migration by the EU and the reality 
of placement opportunities in European countries. Mr Hamzani, current Director of 
International Placement for ANAPEC, considers that the concession provided by this 
subsidy was the consequence of certain favourable economic circumstances that had 
already changed by the time the policy was to be implemented: 
At the time of the creation of ANAPEC [in 2001], numerous reports were published which 
predicted substantial labour needs in Europe [...], at least that was what was announced in 
those reports. The Europeans hurriedly introduced programmes in order to be able to 
respond to those needs. Unfortunately, the following economic circumstances in Europe 
were not those announced in the reports. [I]t’s the entire economic situation that explains 
                                                          
7 See the subsidy resolution of the General Direction of Immigration for the year 2007 (BOE, 2007). 
8 This subsidy was handed over as part of MEDA 2. This programme used to embody the financial 
axis of EU cooperation with Mediterranean countries within the frame of the Euro–Mediterranean 
partnership. 
the different projects that were brought to life at the time. This is how this famous 
concept came to be that I still have a hard time understanding: circular migration? 
(Director of International Placement, 16 March 2010, ANAPEC, Casablanca) 
Fatima Ben Ouali, former Director of Cooperation and Development for ANAPEC, also 
remembers that the project had never targeted seasonal workers, even during its 
development: 
 
[It] consisted of training Moroccans to go abroad. [B]ack then, the French kept their 
distance from the project; they were never really interested in this opportunity for 
recruitment. We had two or three instances of over 50 girls leaving to work [in Spain] in 
elderly care. But the MEDA funds were inexhaustible. It was only about a few hundred 
people, there wasn’t enough demand. [W]hen Aeneas-Cartaya obtained a subsidy of EUR 2 
million, the Spanish embassy contacted me. [W]e started to discuss the matter of seasonal 
workers. [I]t was truly lucky for ANAPEC because there were funds to be used. [E]ven with 
the seasonal workers, we had to extend for over two years in order to use up the subsidy 
(Former Director of Cooperation and Development for ANAPEC, 29 July 2011, Rabat) 
In 2006, Fatima Ben Ouali met the people in charge of the Aeneas-Cartaya project and 
both organizations signed a partnership agreement with the aim, according to the current 
director, to ‘implement in Morocco what Aeneas-Cartaya was planning to do once the 
border had been crossed’. However, as early as 2003, ANAPEC had as a national 
employment agency already participated in the recruitment of seasonal workers for the 
strawberry industry, which, according to Mr Hamzani, had been gravely mismanaged: 
 At the time, Abbas El Fassi was Minister of Employment. He had put people from his 
Istiqlal Party all over the ministry. [W]hen the offer came from Spain, it wasn’t handled by 
ANAPEC, it was the director who took it and had it handled elsewhere. [I]t was an offer for 
800 people. We sent a bit of everything: it was a way to cross the Mediterranean to 
Europe completely safely, instead of resorting to pateras.9 The women would arrive in 
Tarifa and cars were already waiting to take them off to Italy or France. Employers waited 
but nobody came. [A]fter that, the Spanish didn’t want to work with them. The EU didn’t 
want to work with that partner. [B]efore the implementation of MEDA [2] the first 
prerequisite was to change the management of ANAPEC. The general director, Chafik 
Rachid … well, he was fired by the Europeans [laughs] 
(Director of International Placement, 17 July 2011, ANAPEC, Casablanca). 
                                                          
9 Dinghies used for the clandestine crossing of the Strait of Gibraltar. 
On his side, the programme coordinator on the Spanish end confirms that before the 
implementation of the Aeneas-Cartaya project less than 10 per cent of women returned 
to Morocco: 
An important part of this non-return happened upon arrival in Tarifa. [A] significant 
number left even before work started, they didn’t even reach the strawberry fields, they’d 
get here, damn, and then whoosh; and another portion would go work, stick around for 
about a month and when the month was over, well ciao. So we had a meeting in order to 
analyse and reflect and we began looking for the causes of this flight. And at that moment, 
the people we had out in the field, the women, explained to us that … how to say … the 
management of ANAPEC wasn’t as transparent as it should have been. [S]o given the 
opacity and lack of transparency of ANAPEC then, people would say ‘If I’m obliged to pay 
an extortionate fee in order to be on that list… and in the end, I’m pretty much paying for 
the patera. If I have to pay for the patera, I might as well leave when I get to Tarifa’. When 
we detected these dysfunctions, we tried to subtly and diplomatically talk about it to 
ANAPEC: ‘What’s going on here, what can we do?’ They get angry … they manage stuff 
from minister to minister over there, and many heads roll 
(Coordinator of Aeneas-Cartaya project, 14 May 2009, Office for foreign and seasonal 
workers, Cartaya). 
This is the context in which the partnership between Aeneas-Cartaya and ANAPEC began 
in 2006, and in which the selection, recruitment and transportation procedures were 
established. This context appears to be the source of a certain zeal on the Moroccan side 
to ensure, via the selection criteria, that the workers return to Morocco at end of the 
season: ‘We had no margin left, we couldn’t afford any more foolishness,’ confirmed 
Fatima Ben Ouali. Mr Hamzani, on his side, justifies the tightness of the selection criteria 
based on past mistakes: ‘At the point when we took over, that’s why we adopted contrary 
arrangements, that’s why we chose women with children. We couldn’t dispatch any young 
women. The people from the Istiqlal used to send graduates from high school and 
university.’ 
From 2006 to 2009 when selection took place the candidates would convene, generally 
around the month of October, in order to be selected by representatives from  Huelvan  
employer  organizations.  The procedure generally took place as follows:  the  selected  
woman  signed  a  contract  with  the  recruiting  employers’ cooperative and returned 
home while ANAPEC took care of the application for a work visa. Whenever the campaign 
began, the employer transmitted her request for seasonal workers to Cartaya, who then 
relayed the information to the relevant ANAPEC agency. The agency contacted the 
individual and arranged a departure date. The woman had to get to the port of Tangier, 
where she was taken into the charge of agents from ANAPEC as well as intercultural 
mediators hired by Aeneas- Cartaya. She received her passport with a valid visa, 
proceeded to cross the Strait of Gibraltar and was welcomed at the port of Tarifa by 
further mediators who guided her to the buses leased by employer organizations. She was 
then sent to her respective village and finally driven by her employer to the farm. During 
the season, the mediator was supposed to provide translation services between the 
employers and the seasonal workers in cases of incomprehension or conflict. They also 
should ensure communication with the hospitals in cases of workplace accidents and they 
should offer ‘integration’ training for the seasonal workers as well. 
However, for the past two years, there have been no new selections. The contingent 
diminishes each year and only those women who have already worked a season or more 
are hired again. In order to understand the form recruitment practices have taken on, it is 
important to take a look at the intermediaries available to employers in Morocco and, 
among those, specifically at Fresdeloc. While ANAPEC tried to spread recruitment across 
all rural Morocco in 2006 at the beginning of the Aeneas-Cartaya programme, de facto 
recruitment has concentrated in the north-west of Morocco, particularly in the province 
of Kenitra (see map 12.1). 
This can be explained by existing links between the producers in Huelva and those among 
them who were also established in Morocco. They aimed at selecting women who already 
had experience in harvesting strawberries. José Moreno, who used to work for Freshuelva, 
the cooperative that recruits the majority of seasonal workers from Morocco, remembers: 
There was a lot of help from Fresdeloc, who contributed their local knowledge. Where are 
the labour pools? [S]ome [Fresdeloc staff] carried out the pre- selections because they 
knew the locals, […] because it’s easier when you know Morocco, just from looking at 
them you can tell who’s likely to be worth it for work and who’s not. [T]hey made their 
meeting rooms available for the selection process. [F]resdeloc was the management 
centre. Moulay Bousselham is a poor rural area and Fresdeloc might have known the 
father, the mother, the son, sometimes we even called in people by family 
(José Moreno, Fresdeloc’s headquarters, 22 July 2010, Moulay Bousselham). 
  
 
Map 12.1 Origin of Moroccan female workers contracted for Huelva by the recruitment agency 
ANAPEC and its regional offices (2010) 
Source: Database established by the Aeneas-Cartaya project (2010) 
 
 
The recruitment carried out by the manager of Fresdeloc Morocco during the first years 
for the benefit of the Spanish headquarters, apparently supplied particularly appreciated 
workers. This might be due to this family orientated selection where each seasonal worker 
must work correctly and abide by the rules established by the employer in order not to 
shame their relatives. This mode is far from being unfamiliar; it is also common among 
Moroccans contracted for agriculture in the French region of Bouches-du-Rhône (see 
Sippel and Gertel, this volume). But even if this recruitment mode was at the origin of the 
migration flow, the Aeneas-Cartaya project and its collaboration with ANAPEC introduced 
new forms of professional and anonymous recruitment. 
 Channelling mobility through family attachment 
The recruitment criteria established by employer organizations in partnership with 
Moroccan authorities aimed at providing a reliable workforce adequate for harvesting 
strawberries, while also ensuring that the workers returned home. In order to attain these 
objectives, Moroccan authorities decided to recruit married women (aged between 18 
and 45) with young children under the age of 14, proved by their family records during 
pre-selection: 
We introduced this criterion for technical reasons: some claimed that we took these 
women as hostages, that it was a matter of discriminatory criteria, but that’s the way it is. 
First of all, it’s an opportunity for the family because it implies a considerable 
redistribution. What’s more, the attachment principle improves the rate at which the 
women return and my duty as a public service is to facilitate their return. [W]e ask a 
married woman to co-sign the application with her husband so as to show that the 
decision was taken by both of them. In 2006, we had legal complaints against women who 
left, who abandoned their husband, their children and effectively abandoned their lives. 
So the second time, in 2007, they co-signed the application so as to show that they really 
discussed the project with their husbands and that they’re ready to support their 
candidacy 
(Director of International Placement, 16 March 2010, ANAPEC, Casablanca). 
These views demonstrate that Moroccan managers consider gender as being one  of  the  
most  effective  control  mechanisms  of  the  worker’s  mobility.  They select according to 
the level of attachment to country and family depending on their domestic position in 
terms of production and reproduction. The policy of this Spanish–Moroccan collaboration 
is hence to create a mobile labour force which Meillassoux1010  termed ‘rotating 
migration’ and which is echoed today in the  international  migration  management  
spheres  in  the  expression  ‘circular migration’. The model consists of a temporary 
relocation of these workers while they maintain their ‘life center’ in the homeland.  This is 
reminiscent  of  the double capitalist project described by Meillassoux (1975) in Femmes, 
greniers et capitaux consisting of preserving the domestic sphere while exposing them to 
‘the exploitation of overwork’. 
Controlled labour circulation does not stop with recruiting women with children on the 
basis of temporary contracts. Beginning in 2008 as a consequence of the economic crisis, 
the number of contracts allotted to seasonal workers from Morocco has diminished each 
year, shrinking from 11,000 in 2008 to 4,000 in 2011. This reduction elicited substantial 
concerns among the seasonal workers who feared that their contracts would not be 
renewed if they returned to Morocco and they started to consider staying in Spain after 
their contracts ended. Faced with this situation, the managers of Aeneas-Cartaya added 
another control mechanism. In all villages where the Moroccan women were employed, 
meetings were organized to discourage what the seasonal workers call h’rague, namely 
the practice of illegally remaining in Spain. In these meetings, mediators from Aeneas-
Cartaya insisted that from now on, women should not remain in Spain after the end of the 
harvesting season, even if their visa was still valid. They were asked to return together on 
the same bus, claiming that otherwise they would not be back in time to register for the 
following year’s work, which would jeopardize their return. Refuting this information, Mr 
Hamzani confirmed that the seasonal workers had ‘the right to move about as long as they 
did not overstay their visa. [B]ut still, we don’t want to say that too much so as to prevent 
“haemorrhages” that would affect the contingent so we encourage their collective return.’ 
Fatima, a young seasonal worker, describes one of these meetings she attended in 
Moguer: 
                                                          
10 The reference to Meillassoux (1975) does not mean that I consider the Moroccan economy to be 
domestic in nature. However, in Morocco as anywhere else, contrary to the idea that the passing 
from feudalism to capitalism would inevitably reduce non-capitalist social relationships to the 
state of subsistence, these relations obviously remain central (Falquet, 2009). 
When […] the boss found out that there are many women who want to stay here and buy 
a contract,11 and that there are many women who want to apply  for  their  papers  at  the  
foreigners’  registration  office,  the  bosses informed the cooperatives that they needed to 
talk to the Moroccan women and set up this meeting. Each boss went in with two or three 
workers. They said to us: ‘If you stay here, you’ll have a lot of problems, if you buy a 
contract, you can only throw it in the bin. You don’t want any money? Then buy that 
contract, it’s not worth anything.’ [T]hey told us they couldn’t fix the papers, they also said 
that: ‘If you marry a Spanish man, you can’t get your papers fixed’; they closed down all 
the doors, you know, so that the people return home once more. They said we want 
‘return, return, return!’. There are women who, as soon as the meeting was over, left for 
Italy or for France  the  following  morning,  they  said,  ‘They  can  go  to  hell!’,  you 
understand? 
(Fatima, 28- year-old farmworker, 30 June 2010, Moguer). 
This project illustrates one of the aspects of the European outsourcing policy to control 
the mobility of migrants. The idea of outsourcing borders as popularized in France by the 
association Migreurop is often used to describe the outsourcing of the mechanisms 
governing the fixation, detention and deportation of foreigners at the periphery of the EU. 
In the case of the Aeneas-Cartaya-ANAPEC project, the case of outsourcing manifests itself 
in a constrained circulation of foreigners for the benefit of the strawberry industry and at 
the lowest cost for the Spanish state. The provision of a workforce that is to return to its 
home country at the end of the season becomes a Moroccan challenge, as demonstrated 
by this conversation with an ANAPEC official: 
It’s ANAPEC [that chose these criteria] nobody forced us to. The Spanish never asked for 
women with children. [W]e know there are fixed quotas in this kind of programme, so I, on 
my side, have to maximize the rate of return in order to find more opportunities for next 
time 
(Mr Hamzani, 16 March 2010, ANAPEC, Casablanca). 
The outsourcing of migration policy regulation to Morocco comes hand in hand with 
another transfer: the shift of recruitment expenses onto public funds. Fatima Ben Ouali 
states: ‘If we consider the situation, Andalusian employers got lucky, they were funded by 
                                                          
11 In Huelva, forged one-year contracts are sold for anywhere between EUR 1,000 and 1,500 by 
farmers or middlemen. They allow the regularization of undocumented foreigners who have been 
present in Spain for three years or the permanent stabilization of foreign seasonal workers. 
 
the government, funded by the region, and funded by Morocco.’ Mr Hamzani, for his part, 
emphasizes that this recruitment strategy offers an opportunity for employers: 
It’s a service that is there, that responds to the needs of employers. Mediation is 
important; otherwise, how would employers handle the ebb and flow of workers; we will 
always need mediation. It is appealing for the employers. Many tasks are carried out by 
mediators: escorting to the hospital, organizing travel, administrative work, transport, 
baggage. Employers would be absorbed by these tasks. If there are no mediators, it all gets 
done but it weighs on the business, it costs time and money. Mediation is an added value; 
it allows the reduction of charges and employers come off a lot better that way 
(Mr Hamzani, 17 July 2011, ANAPEC, Casablanca). 
 
Captivity and flexibility 
Although workers are formally in a legal situation and protected by labour legislation, it is 
difficult to assert their rights as any denunciation exposes them to the risk of having to 
return home, of not having their contract renewed or of slipping into clandestineness. 
Deviations and exceptions thus have become the rule, allowing the implementation of 
production flexibility in Huelva, which is welcome in light of the reduction of the 
profitability margin of strawberry farming (Berlan, 2009; Reigada Olaizola, 2009). In the 
case of seasonal migration from Morocco, the entire recruitment system attempts to 
adjust as much as possible to the producers’ needs. An official from the sub-delegation of 
the government of Huelva claimed, for example, that the number of contracts allotted to 
each employer is decided as the campaign progresses ‘according to the local weather and 
employment situation’ (Subdelegación del gobierno, 21 June 2010, Huelva). Even if a 
contract is signed in Morocco, the Spanish employer only lets the seasonal workers come 
depending on production needs, as testified by Houcine, a young Algerian working as an 
interpreter on a farm which employs Moroccan women: 
The boss has a lot of work; he faxes a request to Morocco so they send people over. When 
there’s less work … he doesn’t fax anything. When there are a lot of strawberries, there 
are a lot of people 
(Houcine, undocumented farmworker, 10 March 2010, Moguer) 
 
This vision of Morocco as a ‘labour pool’ or reserve quota (cupo de reserva) is shared by 
all the players in the system right up to the main agricultural worker unions. The regional 
delegate of the agricultural department of the Workers’ General Union (UGT, Unión 
General de Trabajadores) sums up the union’s opinion as follows: 
The UGT’s position is that Morocco is a reserve quota.  
E. H.: And what does that mean exactly? That they’re over there, in their country, ready to 
come in case they’re needed. 
(Regional Secretary for union action and migration, UGT, 4 May 2011, Huelva). 
 
In 2008, more than 1,000 women were never called up for work in Spain although they 
had signed their contract, because in the end employers just didn’t need all the workers 
they recruited, or because work permits had arrived too late and Romanians had been 
sent for instead: 
There always comes a time when [the employers] don’t want them anymore. For instance, 
we begin planning departures. The farmers are out in the field, they observe how their 
campaign is evolving, they increase their contingent as they go along and, eventually, they 
stop. I always tell them: ‘At the point when you’ve had them sign the contract, have them 
come over to work, even if it means splitting the work up among them. Those who got 
here first, they get to rest and you have the new ones do the work.’ We lived through a lot 
with the Spanish. [E]very year, we ask them: ‘At least tell us the departure date of the 
women in July.’ They’re unable to tell us. I understand that, I know them; they’re farmers, 
not managers in the middle of planning their campaign 
(Director of International Placement, 17 July 2011, ANAPEC, Casablanca). 
 
In practice, access to this workforce gives employers a great deal of flexibility: if it rains, 
the workers do not work; if the price of strawberries is not good, the team is reduced and 
the workers arrive gradually as the strawberry production increases. In addition, this 
flexibility allows farmers to only include workers who work at a rate that is profitable for 
the farmer. A farmer interviewed near the end of the 2011 campaign explained why some 
women had to stay in the houses while the rest of the team was at work: 
Six women didn’t work yesterday because they only picked very few crates [he shows us 
the slip where the number of crates picked is marked down]. This one picked 14 crates – at 
least that’s what the slip says, but if you have a look inside the lorry you won’t find 14 
crates. [He takes a calculator.] Fourteen crates: that’s 70kg for EUR 0.65 a kilo for a total of 
EUR 45.50. This woman earns EUR 39.10 here and costs me EUR 12 in social security, 
[which] adds up to EUR 51.10. I also have someone tasked with irrigation and four women 
doing the packing inside the lorry. I consume water, phytosanitary installations …The 
women who pick 22 or 23 crates earn their wages. Those who do less make me lose 
money 
(Eduardo, farm owner, 20ha, 14 May 2011, Moguer). 
 
Gender regimes 
In spite of the omnipresent control mechanisms, female migrants should not be reduced 
to agricultural workers without any scope for action. The question arises as to what does 
the entry of these migrating women into the international labour market really change? 
Does the gender regime on which the transfer of these women partly relies truly exist, at 
least in the form envisioned by employers, and is it at all efficient in controlling their 
mobility? It becomes evident that a gender regime is mobilized by Spanish employers as 
much as by Moroccan institutions in order to ensure the control of the women’s mobility. 
Put in other terms, the way in which Spanish employers and males of higher social classes 
in Morocco perceive rural women make the latter into ideal candidates for temporary 
migration. The decision-makers imagine that the women will carry out their work and 
then return, as they are under the control of their spouses or because their maternal 
instinct, as well as domestic tasks, prevent them from unduly prolonging their absence. 
These representations appear in the description supplied by an employer to Reigada 
Olaizola (2009): 
It’s already been five years and every year, they come back and none of them leave; 
they’re wonderful! Why? Because they’re people who’ve been working ever since they 
were born, like those whose husbands ride the donkey and they follow, being loaded with 
wool, you know? And almost all of those who come are married, people who come and 
earn money for their children who are over there, those are people on whom you can 
count 
(Large contractor; quoted from Reigada  Olaizola, 2009, p. 264, o.t.). 
 
Faced with such images, it is crucial to highlight the gap that exists between Spanish 
employers’ visions or those of the Moroccan institutions on the one hand, and the reality 
as reflected during the interviews on the other hand. First, Morocco is not a country 
deadlocked in a particular gender regime (Moujoud, 2009). Furthermore, when placing 
the question in a historical context, it appears that these women do not all fit into the 
wage-earning classes by migrating to Spain. Moreover, an important part of the 
contingent comes from Kenitra, thus from the Gharb region, which was Morocco’s cereal 
production heartland in colonial times, where women have been working as fellahas12 
under a regime of colonial exploitation since the 1930s (Le Coz, 1964; Mernissi, 1981): 
Eighty to ninety per cent of the girls work just as they did before getting married. It 
depends on the family’s economic or financial situation. There are families who get paid a 
bit better so they don’t send their daughters to work outside but there are others who 
need money so it’s normal for them, whether the girl or the boy goes to work, it’s all the 
same 
(Teacher in the village of Ouled Ziane, Kenitra, 24 February 2010). 
  
Besides, most of the seasonal workers interviewed are rehired in Moroccan farms when 
the Spanish season ends. Hence, the colonial postcard perception offered by the 
aforementioned Andalusian farmer does not really correspond to the reality of the 
women I met in the Gharb countryside, who are often proletarianized. Correspondingly, 
the image that all female seasonal workers have family ties and are ideally married does 
not hold true: about 40 per cent of the contingent comprises women who are no longer 
tied to a man back home (see figure 12.2). As far as the negotiation of their departure 
from Morocco is concerned, many women affirm not having had too many problems in 
convincing their husbands or the head of their family to let them go. The men’s 
objections, if any, do not have much to do with them going to work in Spain per se but 
more that the women go to work while the men don’t. For many young women, be they 
single, widowed or divorced, the family also supports migration projects. When they 
                                                          
12 Fellaha is the Arabic feminine designation for peasant but it is used here to denote rural 
inhabitants or agricultural workers. 
 
experience surprised reactions, a few of them might smile and say: ‘Moroccans want 
money; the rest can be managed.’ Thus, seasonal migration does not represent any radical 
rupture with the previous situation of women who were already working in Morocco and 
their mobilization by Spanish employers is met with a certain responsibility on their part 
as well as an agreement on the side of the families. 
One cannot deny, however, that their seasonal work implies a certain reallocation of 
domestic tasks. Given that most seasonal workers have children under 13 years of age, 
their departure to Spain implies a transfer of some chores to other women of the family: 
Aisha’s mother, for instance, complains, in front of her daughter, about the extra work 
that she will have to assume during the season and about the fact that Aisha left before 
her last son, Ali, had even learned to walk. In trying to involve me, she describes her daily 
work whenever her daughter leaves for Spain: 
MOTHER: I sleep here, I go to Aisha’s in the morning to make breakfast, then I work in the 
fields, I go back home to eat, I go to Aisha’s a second time to make the meloui and the 
harcha13 and then I go back home. 
E. H.: That’s a lot of work, isn’t it? 
AISHA: Just like the one working in strawberries. 
MOTHER: Yeah, that’s true, so pay me. If you get EUR 2,000, we’ll split fifty-fifty: a 
thousand for you and a thousand for me. 
 (Aisha Manar, seasonal worker since 2008, and her mother, Douar Zaalka, Kenitra, 3 
March 2010). 
As far as demographic behaviour is concerned, working for many seasons in a row changes 
the women’s behaviour. They may plan their pregnancy to minimize the risk of losing a 
contract, such as seen in the case of Fatiha, who is 26, already has two children and has 
been working in Spain seasonally for four years. When she wanted a third child, she 
arranged to get pregnant just before the beginning of the season so that she could have 
the first part of her pregnancy in Spain while still being able to work, then returned home 
and gave birth in the fall as soon as possible so that the child would be old enough that 
                                                          
13 Moroccan crepe and semolina bread. 
she could leave again the following year. Such developments demonstrate a paradox also 
already raised by Meillassoux (1975): 
 
 
Figure 12.2 Marital status of Moroccan female seasonal workers under contract in Huelva (2010, 
total 4,742) 
Source: Database established by the Aeneas-Cartaya project (2010) 
 
it is their status as women and as mothers and thus their place in production and 
domestic reproduction relations that make these seasonal workers so attractive to 
employers; their wage earning, however, implies changes in the relations that make 
reproduction subordinate to the work contract and not vice versa. 
In certain families still operating on the model of the extended family, individualization 
processes are put in motion. Malika, a widow of 45, had lived in her husband’s parents’ 
house from the beginning of her marriage. During the last season, she wanted to keep 
part of the money for her children and herself. Faced with her refusal to contribute to the 
extended family as before, her husband’s parents, who had been looking after the 
children in her absence, showed her the door. She built herself a gourbi14 using the EUR 
500 she had left from the season, went back to Spain the following year and brought back 
EUR 1,500 with which she built permanent walls for a new house a mere 20m away from 
her in-laws’ property. She could hardly wait for the end of the following season, which 
                                                          
14 Gourbi is a North African term for a hut or a provisional shelter. 
would allow her to build the roof. All these dynamic factors make it possible to 
understand the ‘formal consent’ shown by seasonal workers when they re-sign their 
contract, year after year. Thus, when Malika claims that ‘Spain is nice. There’s money. Not 
so in Morocco, you work, you eat, that’s it. It’s not like in Spain where you work and, if 
God wills it, you’ll get a house; Spain is nice’ (Malika Zitouni, Douar Ouled Ziane, 24 June 
2011), it does not mean that she does not view the working, living and isolation conditions 
of the farm she works on in Huelva without any criticism; rather, in spite of these facts, 
she still considers that seasonal migration is objectively the best way for her to improve 
her situation in Morocco. 
Outlook and perspectives 
To summarize, I want to highlight four points. Alongside international economic and 
financial crises and large-scale turmoil, the recruitment of seasonal workers for agriculture 
increasingly requires flexible strategies in order to cope with farm and production 
requirements. This has translated into the inclusion of the most vulnerable segments of 
society, namely women with little children from peripheral rural regions of the Global 
South, into the global labour market. I have, however, demonstrated the very ambiguity 
between marginal livelihoods and unintended empowerment of female seasonal workers 
from Morocco. The integration into labour markets restructures the most intimate space 
of family organization and simultaneously offers new scope for action via the access to 
comparatively higher cash income: timing pregnancies according to work contracts, 
reinterpreting and severing patriarchal family structures as well as making use of 
opportunities to exit the labour recruitment and domestic system by staying illegally in 
Europe. The political field framing labour regimes is somehow reluctant to keep pace with 
economic developments: while EU funding was allegedly necessary at a specific moment, 
the slow pace of programme implementation offered private businesses, farmers and 
employers the opportunity to redirect public money for their own benefit and interests. 
This ultimately allowed for the reduction of administrative work, services and other 
transaction costs on the farm. Nevertheless, growers’ claims of a labour shortage are not 
easily heard in times of economic crisis and the number of origin contracts has been 
increasingly reduced these last years. An alternative to recruiting the cheap foreign labour 
is to move the production south (see Sippel; Moreno Nieto, this volume), the same 
relocation of production sites that had once brought the strawberry from northern Europe 
all the way to Andalusia. One of Fresdeloc’s producers sums it up: 
This year we decided to develop 40 per cent of our business in Morocco because we 
expect that governments will completely halt the migratory flow. [I]f they tell us that the 
migratory flow stops, our business stops. [N]ow that our workers can no longer come to 
Huelva, we set off for their country’ 
(3 August 2011, headquarters of Fresdeloc Morocco). 
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